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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
LAW OF THE SEA
1981-1982
This synopsis highlights major events occurring between De-
cember 1981, and December 1982, that affect the law of the sea. It
discusses the eleventh session of the Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea and significant events outside the
Conference.
THE ELEVENTH SESSION OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
Introduction
Delegates from over 150 nations gathered in New York from
March 9 to April 30, 1982, for the final session of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS Ill). After
six years of preparation' for the Conference and eight years of ne-
gotiations, 2 most participants planned to complete a treaty which
would be generally acceptable to all countries. 3
1. Miles, The Structure and Effects of the Decision Process in The Seabed
Committee, and The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 31
hnT'L ORGANIZATION 151, 160 (1977). Although the Conference began its substan-
tive work with the third session in 1974, the Ad Hoc Committee on Peaceful Uses
of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond National Jurisdiction started planning and
preparing for the Conference six years earlier. Id.
2. See U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release SEA/460, at 18 (Mar. 3,
1982).
3. President Expresses Belief That Twin Goals Could Be Achieved at Session,
19 U.N. MoNTBLY CHRON., May, 1982, at 23. This is not the first attempt at universal
agreement on rules governing the oceans. The 1958 Conference on the Law of the
Sea failed to produce a comprehensive convention, but instead adopted four
agreements: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.IA.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (signed by 44 parties); the
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82 (signed by 57 parties); the Convention on the Continental Shef; Apr.
29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, TJ.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 312 (signed by 54 parties); and
the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, TJ.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (signed by 35
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As a result of past bargaining sessions, the delegates produced
a Draft Convention 4 covering practically all issues relating to the
law of the sea.5 This document represented a compromise: no
State, no group of States, and no special interest group remained
satisfied with all the terms.6 From the beginning, the United
States placed a high priority on national security interests and
thus was willing to relinquish some control over deep seabed re-
sources in return for navigation and overflight rights.7 Preceding
the tenth and what was to have been the last session of the Con-
ference, the Reagan administration precipitously announced it
would conduct a policy review regarding "serious problems raised
by the Draft Convention."8 To the dismay of Third World coun-
tries, the United States appeared to be questioning the widely-
supported fundamentals of the Draft Convention.9 Although sev-
eral delegates resented this attempt to make substantial changes
at such a late date,O the Conference agreed to consider the
United States concerns when it reconvened."
parties). B. Oxman, A Summary of the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea
n.4 (Feb. 20, 1982) (unpublished paper). In 1967 the United States and the Soviet
Union initiated discussions in hopes of convening a multilateral conference to es-
tablish a twelve-mile limit on the territorial sea and to preserve passage through
international straits. STAFF OF HOUSE COM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHER-
mis, 97th CONG., 2D SESS., UNITED STATES OCEAN PoLIcY SINCE WORLD WAR IM THE
DEBATE OVER A "LAw OF THE SEA" 10 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as
STAFF REPORT]. During the same year, Ambassador Pardo of Malta spoke before
the United Nations General Assembly declaring the seabed lying beyond national
jurisdiction as the "common heritage of mankind." 22 U.N. GAOR Annex 1
(Agenda Item 92), U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967). These two forces, the desire of major
maritime States to secure navigational freedoms, and the claims of the Third
World to the resources of the seabed, led to the convening of UNCLOS I. Ad-
dress by John R. Stevenson before the Philadelphia World Affairs Council and the
Philadelphia Bar Association, 64 Am. J. INT'L L. 634, 636-39 (1970); Stevenson &
Oxman, The Preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2
(1974).
4. The final draft is embodied in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L78 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Draft Convention].
5. HOUSE Comi. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON THE
U.N. THIRD CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 2 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter
cited as UNCLOS III REPORT].
6. Bentham, The Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference: Final Act or Fail-
ure-What Next, 10 INT'L Bus. LAw. I, VI (1982).
7. STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
8. Id. at 20.
9. President Expresses Belief That Twin Goals Could be Achieved at Session,
19 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., May, 1982, at 24.
10. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
Tenth Session (1981), 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1982). According to Mr. Kozyrev (So-
viet Union), "[t]he United States, by its obstructionist position, was pursuing a
certain purpose-that is, to delay the work of the conference or to break it off...
or to achieve decisions on a number of issues.., such as would only be in the
interest of their corporations .... " U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release
SEA/146, at 7 (Aug. 24, 1981).
11. Ratiner, The Law of the Sea: A Crossroads for American Foreign Policy, 60
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United States Position Preceding the Eleventh Session
Administrative Concerns with the Draft Convention
In an effort to allay fears that the United States was seeking
wholesale changes in the Draft Convention, administration offi-
cials attempted to concisely define problems on which the United
States would focus at the eleventh session. On January 29, 1982,
President Reagan announced six necessary objectives of an "ac-
ceptable" comprehensive Law of the Sea treaty:12
1. Development of deep seabed mineral resources to meet na-
tional and world demand,
2. Sufficient national access, security of supply, avoidance of mo-
nopolization by the International Sea-Bed Authority (Author-
ity),13 and economic development of the resources;
3. A decision-making role in the deep seabed regime sufficient to
protect the political and economic interests and financial con-
tributions of participating states;
4. Protection against amendments without approval of partici-
pating states;
5. Prevention of other undesirable precedents for international
organizations; and
6. Modification so that approval by the Senate would be likely.
Elaborating on these objectives at the intersessional meeting,14
the United States suggested several major and minor changes15 to
the Draft Convention. These changes fall into two categories:
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1006, 1013 (1982). In an August 17, 1981 speech before the infor-
mal plenary of the tenth session, the Chairman of the Group of 77 expressed a
willingness to continue negotiating with the United States, but 'there should not
be any reopening of issues already negotiated over a long period of time and
agreed to by all the delegations." UNCLOS HI REPORT, supra note 5, at 22.
12. Speech of President Reagan before the House Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries Committee (Jan. 29, 1982), reprinted in United States Delegation Report,
Eleventh Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
New York, March 8-April 30, 1982, at 26 [hereinafter cited as United States Delega-
tion Report].
13. The Authority is the organization created by the treaty to implement its
seabed provisions. Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 157. The Authority is
made up of the Assembly, which sets general policies; the Council, which imple-
ments those policies; and the Enterprise, which actually mines the ocean floor. Id.
art. 158.
14. The intersessional meeting took place in New York from February 24 to
March 2, 1982. The purpose of the meeting was to begin preliminary negotiations
for the lth session. STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-14.
15. Ratiner, supra note 11, at 1009. Although the President gave the negotia-
tors six broad objectives, the detailed instructions they received were produced by
(1) the potential discouragement of seabed mining; and (2) the
administrative procedures of the Authority.
The Potential Discouragement of Seabed Mining
The Reagan administration objected to the following treaty pro-
visions that could hamper the deep seabed mining industry: nod-
ule production limitations, financial burdens imposed by the
Authority, and the licensing limits on mining operations allowed
each nation.'
6
Seabed mining production ceilings17 exist in the Draft Conven-
tion only for manganese nodules, which contain nickel, cobalt,
manganese, and copper.18 Some estimates put the amount of nod-
ules awaiting development in the seabed at 1.5 trillion tons.19
United States concerns with these mining production limitations
have been heightened by the discovery of polymetallic sulfide de-
posits rich in zinc, iron, sulphur, silver, and copper.2 0 Although
polymetallic sulfides are more easily replenished than manganese
nodules,21 the potentially enormous mining profits from them
may be lost if unreasonable production ceilings are established.22
The treaty gives the Authority power to control non-nodule min-
eral production through any method it determines is appropri-
ate.23 Under the present draft, the Reagan administration
believed that the Authority could place a moratorium on sulfide
various agencies of the government and were not sent to the President for his ap-
proval. Id.
16. Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 151, para. 3.
17. Id. art. 151. The method for calculating the production quota for seabed
mining is extremely complex and takes into account such factors as land-based
mineral production, mineral consumption trend lines, and the linear regression of
logarithms of actual mineral production. Id.
18. UNrTED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COBALT, COPPER, NICKEL AND MANGA-
NESE: FUTURE SUPPLY AND DEMAND AND IMPUCATIONS FOR DEEP SEABED MINING
(1979).
19. Lecture by Dr. Arvid Pardo, University of San Diego International Law So-
ciety (November 25, 1981).
20. Murphy, Polymetallic Sulfides, 7 SOUNDINGS, Nov. 1981-Feb. 1982, at 1.
Most of these deposits are within 200-mile exclusive economic zones, however, and
thus not subject to the treaty's production limitations. Interview with Michael R.
Molitor, former congressional staff delegate, United States delegation to UNCLOS
IlI (Sept. 21, 1982).
21. Sulfides form in much less time than manganese nodules. It may take a
million years for a nodule to grow one inch, while sulfides have grown a foot per
year. Thus, it may be possible to "harvest" the mineral wealth of sulfides periodi-
cally, as opposed to a "one time recovery." Murphy, supra note 21, at 1.
22. For example, the copper content of manganese nodules is about one per-
cent, while copper content of sulfide deposits may range from five to thirty per-
cent. An eight-foot cube of sulfides weighs approximately a ton, yet acres of ocean
bottom are required to produce the equivalent amount of minerals from nodules.
Id. at 5.
23. Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 151, para. 3.
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production to discriminate against seabed miners in favor of
Third World, land-based producers.24
The Reagan administration also believed that the treaty im-
posed harsh financial burdens on industrialized countries whose
nationals will engage in deep seabed mining. The funds required
for the initial Enterprise mining site-perhaps over a billion dol-
lars-would have to be borrowed.25 The mining companies also
would pay a $500,000 application fee and $1,000,000 a year in fixed
annual fees to the Authority.26 These costs create an invisible
cross-subsidy that benefits land-based producers by increasing
the expense of seabed mining, an additional form of regulation at
which the Reagan administration balked.27
Finally, the United States opposed production limitations in the
draft that regulated the licensing of companies to mine the sea-
bed based upon their national affiliation.28 United States produc-
tion of seabed resources would be controlled in relation to other
nations by an anti-monopoly clause, as well as a quota provision
that restricts any one country to a total of two percent of the un-
reserved seabed.29 The Foreign Policy Advisory Council and Stra-
tegic Minerals Task Force issued a report to the President that
concluded-
The Treaty surrenders major political and strategic advantages to the So-
viet Union to the direct disadvantage of the United States. The Soviets
are self-sufficient in the minerals found in seabed nodules, but we are not.
They have successfully negotiated two sets of provisions that give them
near-certain capability of limiting United States access to deep seabed
mineral resources: [1] The Soviet Union sought and gained quota provi-
sion that limits any one country to a total of 2 percent of the unreserved
seabed area. [2] They further gained a general "anti-monopoly" provision
that could be used to discriminate against the United States.3 0
Thus, the Reagan administration's analysis showed that the
United States could face serious long-term problems as a result of
the treaty provisions which limit seabed production by individual
24. See also Keating, The Law of the Sea Treaty: An Overall Assessment with
Recommendations for Executive Action 3 (Dec. 15, 1980) (unpublished manuscript
on file with the authors).
25. U.N. Dep't of Public Information, Press Release SEA/460, at 9 (Mar. 3,
1982).
26. Hearings Before the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Comm., 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Hearings].
27. Keating, supra note 25, at 2.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 4.
nations. 3'
The Administrative Procedures of the Authority
The International Sea-Bed Authority's decision-making power
is shared by two bodies, the Council and Assembly.3 2 All signato-
ries to the Convention are guaranteed a seat on the Assembly but
not on the Council, with the exception of the Soviet bloc countries
which are virtually guaranteed three seats.33 Also, underdevel-
oped nations will likely dominate the Council because the Assem-
bly elects Council members.34 The Reagan administration
believed that this possible imbalance of Third World nations in
both Assembly and Council did not fairly reflect the economic
and political interests of the United States. Thus the United
States would essentially relinquish its control over seabed access
to competing countries, or to land-based producing countries, who
may not wish to see the seabed resources produced at all.35
The method adopted to amend the Authority's administrative
procedure presented a further problem. 36 The treaty provides for
a review conference at the end of fifteen years37 to solicit changes
to Part XI provisions dealing with the seabed area.38 These
amendments are open for consideration for five years so that con-
sensus might be reached, and then voted on if consensus is unob-
tainable. Once two-thirds 39 of the nations ratify the amendment it
becomes binding on all nations, regardless of whether they op-
posed or supported it, unless they choose to denounce the treaty
as a whole.40
Concern has surfaced at a variety of levels that this amendment
procedure may violate the United States Constitution and thus
make it highly unlikely that the treaty could be ratified by the
Senate.41 In a recent speech to the plenary, former Ambassador
31. See generally id. (concluding that United States would make both the mili-
tary and economic concessions to the U.S.S.R. by signing the treaty).
32. Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 161, para. l(a).
33. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
34. Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 161; Keating, supra note 25, at 3.
35. United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release USUN-10 (81),
at 7 (Mar. 17, 1981) (on ifie with authors).
36. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1982, at A4, coL 1.
37. Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 155.
38. The Area is that portion of the seabed which is not within the exclusive
economic zone of a Party State, that is, not within 200 miles of an inhabitable land
form or on a continental shelf. See Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 1, para. 1.
39. This provision was later amended to three-fourths. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
L.132 Annex V.
40. Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 316, para. 1.
41. Malone, Law of the Sea: The American Perspective, 5 J. OF CONTMP. STMU.
83 (1982); United States Delegation Report, Resumed 10th Session of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea at 9 (Oct. 1981).
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Malone said: "[T]he Convention would allow amendments to
come into force for a State without its consent, which [is] clearly
incompatible with United States processes for incurring treaty ob-
ligations."42 In the constitutional context, each time an amend-
ment is added the document becomes a new treaty and subject to
re-ratification by the Senate.43
Two United States Supreme Court cases at the turn of the
twentieth century held that a "treaty must contain the whole con-
tract between the parties and the power of the Senate is limited
to a ratification of such terms as have already been agreed upon
between the President, acting for the United States, and the other
negotiating parties."44 Whether the treaty contains the whole
contract is unsettled, because of the amendment procedures.
Thus, there is no clear judicial answer as to whether the treaty
presents constitutional ratification problems. 45
The final administrative procedure opposed by the United
States concerns the Authority's methods of distributing proceeds
from the Enterprise's deep seabed mining ventures.46 Specifi-
cally, the Authority could give most of these proceeds to countries
which contribute little financial support to the Authority or Enter-
prise, as well as to national liberation movements which contrib-
ute no financial support.47 Some United States Congresspersons
have voiced strong opposition to the concept that organizations
42. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.182, at 14 (1982).
43. United States Delegation Report, supra note 12, app. D at 12 (Apr. 1, 1982)
(speech by former Ambassador James Malone).
44. Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 182 (1901) (Brown,
J., concurring); New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1 (1897).
45. Upon closer analysis of the Draft Convention, however, the constitutional
issue may well be moot. The Review Conference cannot generally adopt a new
amendment until twelve months after the deposit of the instruments of ratifica-
tion, accession, or acceptance by three-quarters of the States Parties. Draft Con-
vention, supra note 4, art. 155, para. 4. Additionally, the denunciation clause
allows any party to terminate its obligations under the treaty upon twelve months'
notice. Thus, the treaty appears to avoid any constitutional problems by allowing
a party to denounce any new treaty prior to being bound. This theory may fail due
to article 315, however, which states that "[a]mendments adopted in accordance
with this Convention shall be open for signature by States Parties to this conven-
tion for twelve months from the date of adoption, at United Nations Headquarters
in New York, unless otheruwise decided in the amendment itself." Id. art. 315 (em-
phasis added). Thus if article 315 allows a shorter period for adoption of amend-
ments than twelve months, a nation could theoretically be bound for up to a year
by an amendment which it opposed.
46. Keating, supra note 25, at 2.
47. Draft Convention, supra note 4, arts. 155, 160.
such as the Palestine Liberation Organization could receive
money from an Authority which is funded largely by United
States dollars.48
United States Negotiating Stance
The United States was widely criticized for these proposed
changes, because most delegates considered the treaty nearly
final at the end of the tenth session. 4 9 The greatest resistance to
the seabed changes came from the Group of 77,50 who fostered
the belief that the United States was undermining the concept
that the seabed belongs to the "common heritage of mankind"51
to promote its own domestic mining production.5 2 The United
States, fully aware of Third World discontent, continued to pur-
sue the President's objectives. This hard-line negotiating stance
in the face of resistance by the Third World countries made it
clear the United States was prepared to put adoption by consen-
sus in jeopardy. 3
Administration officials held several underlying beliefs which
they perceived gave the United States great bargaining strength.
First, due to provisions of Part XI of the treaty, the Enterprise
would have difficulty in financing mining operations54 or securing
48. Speech by Rep. McCloskey, Berkeley Symposium on the Law of the Sea
(Feb. 20, 1982), to be reprinted in B. OxiAN, D. CARON, & C. BUDER4 PERSPECTIVES
ON U.S. PoLIcy TowARD THE LAw OF THE SEA [hereinafter cited as Berkeley
Symposium].
49. Speech by U.S. Ambassador Thomas Clingan, Halifax Conference on the
Law of the Sea (June 21-24, 1982).
50. The Group of 77 is the 120-member negotiating bloc of less developed
countries. Friedman & Williams, The Group of 77 at the United Nations: An Emer-
gent Force in the Law of the Sea, 16 SAN DiNGo L. REV. 555, 555 (1979). As might
be expected, the group originally contained 77 members.
51. For a discussion on the various meanings attributed to the common heri-
tage phrase, see infra note 69 and accompanying text.
52. UNCLOS III REPORT, supra note 5, at 21 (statement of the Hon. Inam UI-
Haq, Chairman of the Group of 77). Chairman Ul-Haq argued that exploitation of
the economic resources of the Area which have been declared to be the common
heritage of mankind provides mankind with a unique opportunity to share the
earth's resources equally among all nations. Id.
There has been significant criticism of the common heritage principles, however,
and many authors believe the system would fail altogether "[ilt destroys the idea
of private property and the incentive to risk money to explore and develop. Who
wants to invest in a company sharing the seabed with a collectivist combine and
subject to the regulation of the 'Authority'?" Saffire, The Great Ripoff, reprinted in
The United States Law of the Sea: A Review of the Issues (on file with the
authors).
53. N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1982, at Al, col. 3.
54. The United States would have been the largest contributor to the Author-
ity had it signed the treaty. In addition, United States mining companies were ex-
pected to contribute greatly to the Enterprise through research and development
of potential aids for use by the Enterprise and through their yearly registration
fees of at least one million dollars each.
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the technology necessary to make deep seabed mining commer-
cially feasible without United States support.5 5 Second, the Rea-
gan administration believed that the United States could continue
to mine the seabed in the 200-mile exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) without the treaty.5 6 Many American islands, such as the
Aleutians, are in chains located in areas of potential nodule ex-
ploitation.5 7 The EEZs emanating from these islands alone could
produce millions of square miles of seabed for exploitation, since
an island with a diameter of ten miles creates an EEZ of at least
132,000 square miles.58 To mine the high seas, the United States
could negotiate reciprocating states agreements with other min-
ing countries dissatisfied with the treaty's provisions. 9 These
agreements could offer an alternate legal regime secure enough to
encourage United States mining if sufficient industrialized na-
tions chose such agreements over the UNCLOS HI treaty.60
Moreover, several other factors contributed to the Reagan ad-
ministration's confidence in its negotiating position: the obvious
worldwide political and military strength of the United States, the
United States concessions previously made during the course of
UNCLOS 111,61 and the lack of enforcement power in the treaty it-
self.62 Some United States senators have argued that the advan-
55. Treaty provisions for mandatory transfer of technology are discussed infra
at notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
56. Article 56, para. l(a) of the Draft Convention grants a coastal State all eco-
nomic resources found within a 200-mile zone extending from their shores. Many
authors have discussed the likelihood that this 200-mile EEZ will become custom-
ary international law regardless of the outcome of UNCLOS III. Comment, Fishery
and Economic Zones As Customary International Law, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 661,
668-70 (1980); Molitor, The U.S. Deep Seabed Mining Regulations: The Legal Basis
for an Alternative Regime, 19 SAN DIEGO L REV. 599, 606-07 (1982).
57. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., OCEAN MANGA-
NESE NODULES 1-25 (Comm. Print, 1976). For the potential locations of nodule ex-
ploitation, see Hom, Horn & Delack, Distribution of Ferromanganese Deposits in
the World Ocean, in FERROmANGANESE DEPOSrTS ON THE OCEAN FLOOR (1972).
58. See Ely, Seabed Boundaries Between Coastal States: The Effect to be Given
Islets as "Special Circumstances," 6 IN'L L 219, 234 (1972). For purposes of com-
putation, a circular island is assumed. Where D = diameter of the island, the
formula for arriving at the EEZ area is A(EEZ) = ir(D/2 + 200)2 - -(D/2)2.
59. See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
61. For example, the United States originally was strongly opposed to the 200-
mile EEZ. J. Breaux, Are There Alternatives to the Law of the Sea Treaty? 9 (Oct.
19, 1982) (unpublished paper on file with authors).
62. UNCLOS I REPORT, supra note 5, at 27-28 (statement of Hon. Inam U1-
Haq). The strongest enforcement provision available against a non-signing nation
is for the complaining State to bring an action before the International Court of
tages of the treaty to defense63 outweigh any detriment from the
seabed provisions and that the United States has unfairly
switched its emphasis from defense to economics. 4 The advisors
to the Reagan administration, however, found that overall the
treaty could adversely affect the United States defensive pos-
ture.65 In sum, the combination of these factors placed adminis-
tration officials in a position where few concessions to the Group
of 77 seemed necessary.
Reaction to the United States Position
The breadth and scope of the changes sought in the Draft Con-
vention created an impression that the United States did not re-
turn to the Conference to negotiate in good faith.66 Alvaro de
Soto, chairman of the Group of 77, noted the United States pro-
posals contained a radical and profound questioning of every as-
pect of the seabed package that had been negotiated in earlier
sessions.67 Even more troubling were the perceived inconsisten-
cies between the United States position and the "Declaration of
Principles" 6a-a United Nations document embodying the com-
Justice. Even if this body ruled that the provisions of the treaty applied to non-
signing nations as customary international law, that decision is not binding on a
nation if it chooses to ignore the ruling and suffer the consequences, that is, eco-
nomic sanctions and world disfavor. Id.
63. Berkeley Symposium, supra note 48, at 17 (speech by Rep. McCloskey).
The treaty settles a variety of disputes concerning international law which would
generally benefit the United States' defense. Some of these include determination
of limits of the territorial sea and navigation and overflight rights (including sub-
marine passage) on the high seas, in territorial seas, in straits, and in archipela-
goes. Keating, supra note 25.
64. Berkeley Symposium, supra note 48 (speech by Rep. McCloskey). Repre-
sentative McCloskey stated that, in his opinion, after President Reagan took office
in January 1982, the ratio of United States interest in the treaty had reversed from
80/20 national security/deep seabed mining to the exact opposite.
65. A report from President Reagan's Foreign Policy Advisory Council and
Strategic Minerals Task Force stated that a variety of strategic problems existed
with the treaty. These included, among other things, the concentration of enor-
mous economic and political power in the Authority which would be dominated by
the Third World, and the lack of United States' assured, continuing, and nondis-
criminatory access to critical minerals needed for our industry and defense. Keat-
ing, supra note 24, at 1-4.
66. United States Delegation Report, supra note 12, at 2.
67. Berkeley Symposium, supra note 48, at 22 (speech by de Soto).
68. Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor, and the
Subsoil, Thereof; Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, GA. Res. 2749, 25
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). In 1970 the United Na-
tions adopted the Declaration by consensus; thus developing countries argue that
it became binding on all participants. Engo, Reply: A Defense of the Draft Conven-
tion, 5 J. OF CoNTEmP. STUD. 89, 91 (1982). On the other hand, several commenta-
tors point out that General Assembly resolutions do not have the force of positive
international law, and that nations often paper over real differences by voting for
ambiguous resolutions to avoid politically embarrassing confrontation. See Arrow,
The Customary Norm Process and the Deep Seabed, 9 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1, 22-
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mon heritage principle.69 The Declaration states, among other
things, that the resources of the area should be managed in such
a manner as to foster the healthy development of the world econ-
omy, and to minimize any adverse economic effects on land-based
producers. The United States objective of eliminating production
ceilings seemed to ignore this mandate.70
According to Lee Ratiner, Deputy Chairman of the United
States delegation, the United States returned to the Conference
ready to convert Part XI into a "'frontier mining code' in which
the first company to stake a claim owns the resources." 71 In re-
sponse to this position, the developing countries reminded the
United States that Secretary of State Kissinger first proposed the
parallel system of mining72 as the legal regime for Part X1.73 The
Group of 77 has always opposed the parallel system, believing
that deep seabed mining should be carried out by the Authority
alone.74 Only after the United States made several concessions
regarding the Enterprise did the Group of 77 finally agree to this
arrangement.75  In its present proposals, the United States
26 (1981). Statements were made at the time of the Declaration's adoption which
support the United States position that it constitutes nothing more than an "agree-
ment to agree." Id. at 27.
69. Considerable disagreement exists over the exact meaning of the "common
heritage" clause in the Declaration. President Lyndon Johnson inspired the devel-
opment of this principle in a 1966 speech in which he stated that "we must ensure
that the deep seas and the ocean bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all human
beings." Address by President Lyndon Johnson at Commissioning of Ship Ocea-
nographer, 2 WEEKLY COmp. PRns. Doc. 930, 931 (July 16, 1966). To the current
chairman of the Group of 77, the common heritage principle implies the notion "of
trusteeship and trustees, which means international machinery; and implies also
the notions of equitable sharing and, perhaps most important, equitable participa-
tion, joint participation." LAw OF THE SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND 154-55 (F.
Christy, Jr., T. Clingan, Jr., J. Gamble, Jr., H. Knight, and E. Miles eds. 1975)
(statement of Alvaro de Soto at the proceedings of the Law of the Sea Institute
Ninth Annual Conference, January 6-9, 1975). Despite the numerous meanings at-
tributed to the common heritage principle, the United States adheres to the posi-
tion that it remains undefined and thus cannot import any legal obligation. Arrow,
supra note 68, at 28-30.
70. Engo, supra note 68, at 91-92.
71. Ratiner, supra note 11, at 1012.
72. Under the parallel system of mining each prospective miner proposes two
sites to the Authority, one bf which could be reserved for mining by the Enter-
prise. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L132/Add.1 Annex IV, at 4 (1982).
73. Engo, supra note 68, at 89, 93.
74. Berkeley Symposium, supra note 48, at 20 (speech by de Soto); UNCLOS
II REPORT, supra note 5, Annex IV, at 29.
75. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 16-17; Berkeley Symposium, supra note
48 (speech by de Soto). The developing countries never conceived of the parallel
seemed to renege on those compromises. 76
Throughout the intersessional meeting and into the eleventh
session, the United States continued to seek the signing of recip-
rocating states agreements with its allies.77 Since the developing
countries perceived these arrangements as mini-treaties for uni-
lateral exploitation of the seabed, they considered such actions as
evidence of the United States' insincerity in negotiating a compre-
hensive treaty.?8 Thus, as the Conference opened March 8, 1982,
in New York, confrontation between the United States and the
Group of 77 appeared inevitable.
The Eleventh Session
At the close of the tenth session in August 1981, three main is-
sues remained to be settled: establishment of the Preparatory
Commission, protection of pioneer mining investments, and par-
ticipation by entities other than States.7 9 Apart from these areas,
delegates agreed to discuss improving the seabed mining provi-
sions only if such changes would enhance the prospects for
consensus.8 0
On March 8, 1982, the New York session began with UNCLOS
III President Tommy T. B. Koh welcoming the decision by the
United States to return to the Conference.81 For the first three
weeks, Committee I, Committee I, Committee II, and the Work-
ing Group of 2182 met separately to negotiate the three pending
system in terms of competition between the Enterprise and private miners. They
believe the Enterprise will benefit the entire world community including the min-
ing countries. UNCLOS III REPORT, supra note 5, Annex IV, at 29.
76. United States Delegation Report, supra note 11, at 2.
77. Ratiner, supra note 11, at 1011; see infra notes 186-89 and accompanying
text.
78. Ratiner, supra note 11, at 1011.
79. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release SEA/494, at 6 (Apr. 30, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Press Release SEA/494].
80. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release SEA/460, at 1 (Mar. 3, 1982).
Consensus is a method of decision-making requiring reconciliation of all views; a
measure passes through lack of formal objection. The Conference chose consen-
sus procedures as the most viable means of producing a treaty which would be
generally acceptable to all countries. Sohn, Voting Procedures in United Nations
Conferences for the Codification of International Law, 69 Am. J. Ih''L L 310, 333-34
(1975).
81. Law of Sea Conference: President Expresses Belief That Twin Goals Could
be Achieved at Session, 19 U.N. MoNTHLy CHRoN., May, 1982, at 23.
82. The eleventh session retained the structure of previous sessions consisting
of three main committees and the Working Group of 21. Committee I dealt with
management and control of deep seabed resources. Given a broad mandate to
cover most of the traditional law of the sea issues, Committee 11 handled such top-
ics as the territorial seas, the exclusive economic zones, and straits. Committee III
developed legal regimes for marine pollution and scientific research. Synopsis, Re-
cent Developments in the Law of the Sea 1977-78, 16 SAN DiEGo I REV. 705, 707-13
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issues. During the same time the United States, in response to
requests for more specific proposals, condensed its intersessional
paper into a comprehensive set of amendments referred to as the
"green book. ''83 Delegates reacted adversely to the proposed
changes; some viewed the book as a frontal assault on the parallel
system of mining.84 To avert a complete standoff on seabed is-
sues, a group of the heads of delegations from eleven western
states (Group of 11)85 produced a set of proposals which they
hoped might bridge the gap between the positions of the United
States and the Group of 77.86
Although the Group of l's proposals failed to address several
concerns expressed in the green book, they did make considera-
ble progress in meeting President Reagan's six objectives. 87 If the
United States delegation had been willing to work with these pro-
posals, perhaps a satisfactory compromise could have been
reached. Instead, the United States delegation voiced its opposi-
tion in such strong terms that Conference leaders concluded the
proposals had been rejected.88 This perceived inflexibility on the
part of the United States provoked intransigence elsewhere.8 9
At the conclusion of informal negotiations, the Collegium rec-
ommended several changes 9o to the Draft Convention and intro-
(1979). The Working Group of 21 was formed at the request of developing nations
to consider Committee I issues in a smaller forum. Synopsis, Recent Developments
in the Law of the Sea: 1979-80, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 533, 535 n.11 (1981).
83. STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 22.
84. United States Delegation Report, supra note 12, at 3. Paul Engo, speaking
as chairman of the First Committee, expressed dismay that the United States
would call for changes which "question all substantive matters in Part XI, showing
no visible evidence of the results of consultations with delegations to date." U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/L.91, at 6 (1982). Because the green book proposed such sweep-
ing changes, many delegates thought this an indication of the United States desire
to delay the work of the Conference for several years. Id. at 7. Thus, the chairman
of the Group of 77 refused to negotiate over the green book. N.Y. Times, Apr. 7,
1982, at A9, col. 1.
85. Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, New Zea-
land, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. The Group of 11 earned the name "good
samaritans" for their efforts. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.91, at 7 (1982).
86. STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 22.
87. Ratiner, supra note 11, at 1015-16.
88. Id. at 1016.
89. United States Delegation Report, supra note 12, at 3. Reacting to the seem-
ingly rigid position of the United States, the Group of 77 insisted that the United
States accept the Group of l1's compromise proposals as an exclusive list of
changes for Part XI.
90. For example, the chairman of the Second Committee found sufficient sup-
port for the United Kingdom's proposal to change the provisions on artificial struc-
duced three draft resolutions: one proclaiming that people of
non-independent territories should benefit from the resources of
the convention, and two dealing with seabed issues.91 After ple-
nary debate on these recommendations, the Collegium incorpo-
rated the approved changes into the text of the Draft
Convention.92 Meanwhile, delegates continued working toward
refinement of the draft resolutions that would be adopted along
with the Convention.93
In keeping with its timetable, the Conference began accepting
amendments on April 7, 1982.94 Thirty-one sets of amendments
were advanced, with the United States, its allies, and the Group of
11 putting forth the most significant proposals.95 After working to
reach a general agreement on the amendments, President Koh
and other Conference officers concluded the majority could not be
incorporated into the Convention.96 President Koh appealed to
the delegates not to press their proposals, because such far-reach-
ing changes could upset the compromises built into the Draft
Convention and destroy potential consensus. 97 Most sponsors
heeded this appeal, including the United States which withdrew
its seabed amendments in hopes of promoting substantive negoti-
ations on its concerns.9 8 Thereafter the Conference voted on only
three amendments; none passed. 99
Throughout the two-month session, Conference leaders focused
primarily on protection of pioneer investors and establishment of
a preparatory commission.100 Thus, the opportunity to deal sub-
stantively with the seabed mining provisions did not arise until
the final ten days of the Conference. President Koh sought a
compromise between the Group of 77 and the United States. Al-
though he had some success,' 0 ' the compromises did not come
close to satisfying United States demands.
tures in the EEZ to require that abandoned structures be "removed to ensure
safety of navigation" instead of a requirement that they be "entirely removed."
Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 7.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 8.
93. Id. The resolutions are not incorporated into the Draft Convention be-
cause they will take effect before the treaty enters into force.
94. Id.
95. United States Delegation Report, supra note 12, at 4-5.
96. Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 9.
97. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.141, at 4 (1982).
98. United States Delegation Report, supra note 12, at 5.
99. Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 9. Two amendments submitted
by Spain concerned passage through international straits; a Turkish amendment
would have deleted the article forbidding reservation to the convention. Id.
100. United States Delegation Report, supra note 12, at 6.
101. Ratiner, supra note 11, at 1016-17, see infra notes 127-31 and accompanying
text.
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On April 30, 1982, the United States forced a vote' 02 on the Draft
Convention and four resolutions. 0 3 One hundred and thirty na-
tions voted in favor, seventeen abstained, and four voted
against. 0 4 In a speech before the plenary, Ambassador Malone
explained that the United States rejected the treaty because the
Conference had totally failed to accommodate President Reagan's
objectives.105
The Convention and Final Act106 were opened for signature in
Montego Bay, Jamaica on December 10, 1982.107 On the first day,
119 States signed.108 Beyond Montego Bay, however, lies the pro-
cess of ratifying the Convention. Once sixty States ratify or ac-
102. To prevent the seabed mining provisions from being enforced as emerging
customary international law, the United States had to call for a vote. Only by per-
sistent protest to the formation of a norm can a State render that norm inapplica-
ble against itself. Arrow, supra note 68, at 4.
103. The four resolutions are summarized as follows: 1) resolution I establishes
a Preparatory Commission for the Authority and the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea; 2) resolution II governs preparatory investment in pioneer activi-
ties by States and private consortia relating to polymetallic nodules; 3) resolution
I proclaims that non-independent territories should benefit from the resource
provisions of the Convention; 4) resolution IV recognizes the right of national lib-
eration movements to sign the Final Act. Draft Final Act of the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Draft Final Act].
104. Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 10. The 17 states abstaining in-
cluded the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Holland,
Luxembourg, Italy, Spain, Thailand, and the Soviet bloc except for Romania. In a
July 9 press release President Reagan noted that these countries produce more
than 60 percent of the world's gross national product and provide more than 60
percent of the contributions to the United Nations. N.Y. Times, July 10, 1982, at AS,
col. 4. Turkey, Israel, and Venezuela joined the United States in rejecting the Con-
vention. Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 10.
105. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/S.182, at 14 (1982). For closing comments by vari-
ous delegates, see Sea Law: "A Rendezvous with History," 19 U.N. MoNTMY
CHRON., June, 1982, at 16.
106. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
122 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Convention]. The Final Act is the legal document
that sets out the results of the Conference. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press
Release SEA/460, at 3 (Mar. 3, 1982). By signing the Final Act, countries merely
register their presence at the Conference. Telephone interview With Michael R.
Molitor, former congressional staff delegate, United States delegation to UNCLOS
III (July 13, 1982).
107. The December meeting was originally scheduled to be held in Caracas,
Venezuela. Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 1. The meeting was resched-
uled to Montego Bay probably in response to Venezuela's decision not to sign the
treaty. Telephone interview with Michael Molitor, supra note 106. The United
States announced on July 9 that it would not sign the treaty. N.Y. Times, July 10,
1982, at A5, col. 4.
108. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release SEA/514, at 2 (Dec. 10, 1982).
cede to it, the treaty will become law for the adhering States. 0 9
Substantive Changes Made to the Draft Convention
International Seabed Area
During the eleventh session the United States joined with six
other industrialized Western countries having a particular inter-
est in seabed exploitation-Belgium, France, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom-to produce
eighteen pages of formal amendments designed to make Part XI
more acceptable.110
The seabed amendments proposed by the seven mining nations
were sweeping in scope, although they omitted many of the origi-
nal changes sought by the United States green book. Those
changes would have:
1. guaranteed that the first generation of seabed investors would
obtain authorization from the Authority to mine the Area
commercially;Ill
2. shifted from the Authority to the States some of the responsi-
bility for ensuring compliance with seabed policies;
3. increased the majority needed for key decisions by the Au-
thority's Council;
4. ensured that no amendments to seabed provisions would take
effect unless they were ratified by all nation States to the Con-
vention or allowed the seabed part of the Convention to be
amended by a two-thirds majority, but would not have bound
States which had opposed those amendments;
5. required the Authority to obtain its mine-sites on the basis of
random selection rather than by choosing the best of two min-
ing sites proposed by the applicant;
6. opened to State and private enterprise areas reserved for the
Authority which went unused for ten years or more;1
12
109. Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 2. Ratification often proves to be
the most difficult part of bringing a new treaty into force. It took an average of six
years following signature of the 1958 Geneva Conventions to achieve a sufficient
number of ratifications to allow them to come into force. Gamble, Where Trends
the Law of the Sea?, 10 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L 61, 76 (1981). For a discussion of the
effect the treaty will have on non-signing nations, see infra notes 164-87 and ac-
companying text.
110. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L78 (1982).
111. The Authority has a great deal of discretion as to which miners will receive
permits to participate in the parallel system. Some of the factors to be considered
are: degree of cooperation with the Authority, ability to transfer needed technol-
ogy to the Enterprise, past mining record of the applicant, and the character of the
mining site to be developed. Draft Convention, supra note 4, Annex III, art. 7.
112. The Authority could reserve considerably more sites than the Enterprise
operation could mine. Keating, supra note 24 at 3.
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7. guaranteed a seat on the Council for the largest consumer of
seabed minerals;" 3 and
8. made less rigorous demands on contractors to transfer tech-
nology" 4 to the Authority." 5
In an effort to strike a compromise between these suggested
changes and the Group of 77's adamant rejection of them," 6 the
Group of 11 also submitted proposals for amendments to the sea-
bed area." 7
These changes affected a large number of articles in the Draft
Convention, but only three that related to the seabed area be-
came part of the Convention:1 8 (1) guarantee of a seat on the
Council to the largest consumer of seabed minerals; (2) the speci-
fication of "development of the resources in the Area" as the first
objective of future international seabed policy; and (3) the re-
quirement that future seabed review conferences follow decision-
making rules of the Law of the Sea Conference" 9 when acting on
any amendments to the Convention.
For the most part, the amendments submitted by western na-
tions were not endorsed by the conference delegates. China and
Peru called the proposals "unrealistic," while other members of
the conference termed them "sweeping and radical."12o To pre-
serve consensus, President Koh asked convention delegates on
April 20, 1982, to withdraw all amendments submitted by their in-
dividual States and informal alliances. 121 The western nations
113. The largest consumer is expected to be the United States. The Soviet bloc
nations are presently guaranteed a seat on the Council, whereas western indus-
trial nations are not. See Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 161, para. 1(b).
114. Commercial miners under the treaty are forced to transfer mining technol-
ogy to the Enterprise or to developing States. They may be compensated for this
transfer under "fair and reasonable terms and conditions." Draft Convention,
supra note 4, art. 144.
115. See Draft Convention, supra note 4, art. 144, para. 2. The Reagan adminis-
tration and mining industry oppose these demands because of the relationship of
technology to defense, and the fear that compensation will never include all the
hidden costs of research and development, and the probability that this
mandatory transfer will discourage United States technological development if the
future exclusive right to its use is denied.
116. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.91, at 6 (1982).
117. Id. at 7.
118. Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 14.
119. This change also included the requirement that all attempts must be made
to reach consensus, and only after exhaustion of these attempts may a vote be
taken.
120. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.182 (1982).
121. Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 15.
complied only after assurances that no other amendments to the
seabed area would be considered, except those proposed by Pres-
ident Koh in two reports issued April 29, 1982.122
The four compromise changes proposed by President Koh123
were to: (1) expand the ability of the Authority to regulate ex-
ploitation of a greater variety of seabed minerals; (2) change the
requirement to amend the seabed Area from two-thirds vote to
three-fourths; (3) prohibit unfair economic practices; and (4) re-
move the clause which required prior investigation by the Author-
ity into whether proposed seabed contracts complied with the
Convention and rules. 124 These proposals were adopted in an ef-
fort to gain consensus prior to the April 30 deadline for
adoption.125
Protection of Pioneer Investments
Protection for pioneer mining companies which have invested
substantial sums in exploring a particular area had never been
discussed prior to the eleventh session. 26 Nevertheless, Confer-
ence leaders recognized that industrial countries representing the
mining consortia needed guarantees that these companies would
be able to continue with commercial recovery at the same sites af-
ter adoption of the Convention.127 The developing countries ap-
peared willing to make significant concessions in this area.128
The issue of pioneer rights dominated the eleventh session, the
principal concerns being size of the site, definition of pioneer in-
vestors, and relationship of pioneer investors to the seabed min-
ing regime embodied in Part X.129 On April 30 the Conference
adopted a preparatory investment protection (PIP) resolution
that represented a combination of the proposals put forth by the
mining nations, the Group of 77, and the Group of 11.130 Accord-
ing to its terms, a State or private investor may qualify as a pio-
neer if it expended $30 million in pioneering activities before
January 1, 1983, with not less than ten percent of that amount
122. These reports were originally distributed as U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L132
and U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.141.
123. Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 14.
124. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L141/Add.1.
125. N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1982, at Al, col. 3.
126. Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 26. A proposal on this subject
was made by the United States three years ago, but withdrawn by President Rea-
gan. Sea Law: "A Rendezvous With History," 19 U.N. MoNTHLY CHRON., June,
1982, at 9.
127. Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 27.
128. Ratiner, supra note 11, at 1014. The developing countries were prepared to
make a concession so significant as to lure United States allies into the treaty. Id.
129. United States Delegation Report, supra note 12, at 7.
130. See Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 27.
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spent on site-specific activities.'13 The developing countries were
given until January 1, 1985, to meet this criterion.132 Aside from
developing countries which may qualify, the resolution limits the
number of pioneers to eight: four consortia composed of nationals
from Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Ja-
pan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States; and
four State-owned enterprises or consortia from France, Japan, In-
dia, and the Soviet Union. 3 3
Under this plan pioneers are confined to exploration activities
that may be carried out in a site limited to 150,000 square kilome-
ters. 3 4 In keeping with the parallel system, each investor must
relinquish half that area to the Enterprise within eight years.
35
The PIP resolution requires each pioneer investor to be spon-
sored by a "certifying State" 3 6 which has signed the Convention.
The Soviet Union objected to this provision as discriminatory.
Not being a member of a consortium, the Soviet Union had to sign
the Convention to qualify for pioneer status, but the U)Tnited
States could participate in pioneering activities without signing if
its firms are associated with a consortium which has a member
from a signatory State. 3 7 This argument drew little support be-
cause once the treaty enters into force and the Enterprise begins
operating, a consortium cannot begin mining activities until all its
members have ratified the Convention. 3 8
Before a certifying State can register a pioneer investor with
the Preparatory Commission, it must resolve overlapping claims
131. Draft Final Act, supra note 103, res. ]a, para. l(a) (i).
132. Id. para. I(a) (iii).
133. Id. para. 1(a) (ii). See Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 29, for a
list of the presently existing consortia.
134. Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 30. The developing countries and
Japan argued for smaller sites in fear that a few countries would monopolize the
most productive areas. Id.
135. Draft Final Act, supra note 103, res. H, para. 1(e).
136. Id. para. 1(c). A certifying State must assure that the necessary funds are
made available to the Enterprise, that the investor meets the qualifications, and
that the area applied for in the application Ooes not overlap with other previously
allocated areas. STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 41.
137. Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 31. The Soviet Union abstained
from the April 30 vote, saying that it "will be unable to become a party to the con-
vention if the resolution ... still contains provisions which place the USSR in an
unfavorable position vis-a-vis several other states." U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.144
(1982).
138. Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 31.
to that site.139 The resolution provides a simple procedure for cer-
tifying States to follow in settling these disputes.140 All delegates
involved considered the PIP resolution on the whole a favorable
response to the industrial countries' demands.141
Preparatory Commission
On April 30, 1982, the Conference also adopted the resolution
establishing a Preparatory Commission for the Authority and the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.142 Probably the
most important responsibilities given the Commission involve
drafting the rules and regulations for seabed mining and imple-
menting the system for protection of pioneer investors.143 Be-
cause these rules may affect vital economic and security interests
of all mining States, membership and the appropriate mode for
decision-making were key issues.144
The United States and other industrial nations wanted coun-
tries which sign only the Final Act to qualify for voting member-
ship in the Preparatory Commission.145 In rejecting this proposal
the Collegium reasoned that "[t]he magnitude of commitment
should determine the level of participation .... ,146 Accordingly,
States signing the Final Act may join in the work as observers,
but not in the decision-making process. Suggestions for the
method of decision-making ranged from simple majority to con-
sensus. The Collegium proposed that UNCLOS HI's rules of pro-
cedure apply for adoption of Preparatory Commission rules of
procedure. Thereafter, the Preparatory Commission should es-
tablish its own method for handling questions of substance.14 7
The Preparatory Commission will now begin meeting at the
seat of the Authority in Jamaica. 48 In addition to drafting rules
and regulations, the Commission will perform other functions
139. Final Draft Act, supra note 103, res. I, para. 5(a).
140. Id.
141. See Ratiner, .supra note 11, at 1014-15; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L91, at 2
(1982).
142. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.30 Annex 1 (1982). UNCLOS III first consid-
ered creation of the Preparatory Commission at the ninth session held in New
York. At that time Conference leaders envisioned it as a forerunner to the Au-
thority. Jenisch, Bridging the Gap for Seabed Mining: Preparatory Instruments
for the New Law of the Sea Convention, 18 SAN DIEGo L REV. 409, 411 (1981).
143. United States Delegation Report, supra note 12, app. D at 1 (Apr. 1, 1982)
(statement of Ambassador Malone to the Plenary). These rules will greatly influ-
ence the decisions of the western mining nations on whether to sign and ratify.
Kimball, Law of the Sea Treaty Passes as U.S. Votes No, 7 SOuNDINGS 1, 2 (1982).
144. See United States Delegation Report, supra note 12, at 11.
145. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.30, at 2 (1982).
146. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.30, at 2 (1982).
147. Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 36.
148. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.30 Annex I at 1, 3 (1982).
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such as establishing a special commission to bring the Enterprise
into early and effective operation, and studying the effect of sea-
bed mining on land-based producers.149 The United Nations will
finance its operation.15o
Participation by Entities other than States
Three groups who sought participation in the conference were
considered: intergovernmental organizations (for example, the
European Economic Community), non-fully independent self-gov-
erning territories (for example, Cook Islands), and national liber-
ation movements (for example, the Palestine Liberation
Organization).151 After considerable discussion, compromises
were reached involving each of these groups.
Intergovernmental Organizations
These associations may become a party to the treaty if a major-
ity of their member States have signed the Convention, 5 2 and
their member States have transferred competence over matters
governed by the treaty to the group.153 The organization remains
a party to the treaty if any one member State still remains party
to it.54 The association must also outline the competence granted
to it by each State in a declaration. If that competence includes
the right to vote in place of the represented State Party, then that
State Party is precluded from voting in addition to the intergov-
ernmental organization.155 The association's vote shall carry the
number of ballots that have been relinquished to it by the State
Party.156
Self-Governing Associated States and Territories
The agreement that these territories shall enjoy full participa-
tion rights was reached in Geneva at the tenth session and incor-
porated into the Convention at this session. 5 7 These provisions
149. Id. at 1-3.
150. Id. at 3.
151. Murphy, supra note 20, at 1.
152. Draft Convention, supra note 4, Annex IX, art. 2.
153. Id. art. 1.
154. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L93, at 3 (1982).
155. Draft Convention, supra note 4, Annex IX, art. 4.
156. Id.
157. See id. art. 305, para. 1.
cover the Cook Islands, Antilles, Niue, St. Kitts-Nevils-Anguilla
and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, all of which were in-
vited to attend the Conference as observers.158
National Liberation Movements (NLMs)
These organizations, which have been participating in the Law
of the Sea Conference as observers, shall be able to sign the Final
Act as observers. They will obtain observer status in the Prepara-
tory Commission and in the Authority's organs.159 This allows
them to represent the views of their people and request protec-
tion of their interests. There are four liberation movements that
have been allowed to join as observers: the South West African
People's Organization (SWAPO), African National Congress of
South Africa (ANC), Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC),
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).160
The United States strongly opposes tile inclusion of NLMs in
the treaty as observers because of Part XI that allows some sea-
bed proceeds to be distributed to observers.161 The NLMs are
prohibited from voting as a party, but may attend and speak at
any Convention 62 meeting. The observers may lobby for regula-
tions that benefit their constituents. 63
Effect of the Treaty on Non-Signing Nations
Since the inception of UNCLOS IlI, delegates have worked for a
treaty that would be widely accepted and easily ratified. 64 The
delegates chose consensus as the method of decision-making to
achieve this goal.165 A crucial question is the effect that the treaty
will have should international consensus fail.166
No treaty in recent history has gained the support of most na-
tions. Since 1946, fifteen treaties dealing with the law of the sea
158. Murphy, supra note 20, at 1.
159. Id.
160. Press Release SEA/494, supra note 79, at 44-45.
161. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
162. Draft Convention, supra note 4, Annex IX. The Draft Convention provides
for future conferences composed of all parties to consider proposed amendments
to the Convention (that is, a review conference for the seabed provisions), as well
as other meetings to elect the judges of the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea and the members of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf. Id. arts. 155-170.
163. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.101 (1982).
164. Sohn, supra note 80, at 333.
165. Id. at 333-40.
166. See Gamble, Post World War II Multilateral Treaty-Making: The Task of
the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference in Perspective, 17 Sn DIEGO
L. REv. 527, 536-39 (1980).
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have been ratified and were still in force on January 1, 1982.167 Of
these fifteen, only three have been ratified by more than eighty
nations, and only one has been supported by more than one hun-
dred nations.16
8
If the treaty fails widespread approval, but is ratified by sixty
States,169 then global acceptance is unlikely. 7 0 A treaty that
"limps into force" will probably mean that the more general provi-
sions of the treaty such as the 200-mile EEZ, will become custom-
ary international law, while more controversial areas, such as
seabed exploration, will remain unresolved.' 7 ' With only this
minimal support, the impact of the treaty on non-signing nations
could be negligible.'7 2 Conversely, if most nations adopt the
treaty, perhaps 140 or more, it would be more likely that the
treaty as a whole would become binding on all States as custom-
ary international law. 73
Although the president of the Conference has threatened to
challenge any nation violating the principles of Part XI in the In-
ternational Court of Justice, 7 4 it is questionable whether this ac-
tion could produce little more than "a chilling effect on seabed
mineral investment" due to the resultant protracted litigation. 7 5
Furthermore, a ruling by the International Court of Justice could
not enforce provisions of the treaty on non-signing nations unless
those provisions had become customary international law.
7 6
Should the treaty fail to attract widespread support, the most
delicate issue to be resolved will be the seabed area. Already
some seabed developers from nations endorsing seabed mining as
a freedom of the high seas have begun to consider making
"claims" to the ocean floor.'7 7 This action is likely to cause a hos-
167. Id. at 537-39.
168. Id.
169. See Convention, supra note 106, art. 308.




174. Ratiner, supra note 11, at 1017.
175. Id.
176. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of
Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1) (6), 59 Stat. 1031, 1043, T.S. No. 993.
177. One such developer has actually submitted a claim: "Notice of Discovery
and Claim of Exclusive Mining Rights, and Request for Diplomatic Protection and
Protection of Investment, by Deepsea Ventures, Inc." Letter from John E. Fipse
to Henry A. Kissinger (Nov. 14, 1974), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 51
(1975).
tile response from those nations who endorse the common heri-
tage of mankind concepts.178  However, the present climate of
questionable stability may cause mining companies to be reluc-
tant investors of the approximately $500 million necessary to de-
velop a site without some assurances of security. 7 9 In the
absence of a widely supported international agreement, the min-
ing companies would be forced to look to their own national gov-
ernment for support.
The United States has formally taken the position that deep
seabed mining is a freedom of the high seas' 80 by passing the
Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act of 1980 (Deep Seabed
Act).181 This Act is United States law on seabed mining until su-
perseded by a comprehensive law of the sea treaty.182 The Deep
Seabed Act controls the licensing and issuance of permits for the
mining of deep sea resources by United States citizens or
corporations.
Mining companies who seek security for their investments may
find the Deep Seabed Act meets their need.183 Although the
United States could provide military security for mining opera-
tions, the Deep Seabed Act primarily relies on three congenial
methods to ensure security. First, interference from United
States citizens will be prevented by exercising jurisdiction over
them.184 Second, the Act requires the Secretary of State to at-
tempt to reconcile conflicts with citizens or corporations of other
nations.185 Finally, the United States will act to control other na-
178. Ratiner, supra note 11, at 1017.
179. Id.
180. Deep Seabed Hard Minerals: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Oce-
anography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 50 (1974) (statement of Charles N. Brower, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. De-
partment of State) ("[a]t the present time, under international law and the High
Seas Convention, it is open to anyone who has the capacity to engage in mining of
the deep seabed subject to the proper exercise of the high seas rights of the coun-
tries involved; it is the legal opinion of the United States that exploration for and
commercial recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed are freedoms
of the high seas...").
181. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1605 (Supp. V 1981).
182. Id. § 1402(b) (2). The Act authorizes the Administrator of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to issue licenses for exploration, and
permits commercial recovery of the deep seabed resources to United States citi-
zens or corporations and other entities controlled by United States citizens. Id.
§ 1413. United States citizens are forbidden to engage in seabed exploration or ex-
ploitation unless they receive a license or permit. No commercial recovery is per-
mitted prior to January 1, 1988, a date sought by Ambassador Richardson to
minimize international friction while not slowing the timetables of private seabed
miners. Id. § 1411(a).
183. 1982 Hearings, supra note 26, at 2 (speech by Conrad Welling).
184. 30 U.S.C. § 1412(b) (2) (Supp. V 1981).
185. Id. § 1412(b) (4).
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tions and their citizens through the use of controversial recipro-
cating states agreements. 86 If the United States succeeds in
forming such agreements with other major mining countries, min-
ers may feel secure in their rights to exploit a particular site. 8 7
Convinced that reciprocating states agreements provided a via-
ble alternative to the Draft Convention, 8 8 the Reagan administra-
tion made concerted efforts to sign such agreements before the
eleventh session. 89 However, once the session began the other
mining nations heeded a warning by President Koh that such ne-
gotiations jeopardized the successful conclusion of UNCLOS 1190
and postponed discussions of these mini-treaties. Many confer-
ees believed that negotiation of a reciprocating states agreement
at a time when the United Nations was striving for consensus in a
multilateral treaty was a bad faith gesture.' 9 1
After adoption of the Convention, the United States convinced
France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom to sign an agree-
ment to resolve any conflicting claims filed by seabed mining con-
sortia. All three countries, however, reserved a right to ratify the
Convention. 92 Several commentators believe that most industrial
186. See id. § 1428. The Act gives the Administrator of the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration authority, with direct participation of the State
Department, to enter into agreements with "like-minded" countries for reciprocal
recognition of each other's claims to the seabed. Id.
187. The United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany have
enacted mining laws similar to the United States qualifying them as "like-minded"
countries. See Law of the Sea Negotiations, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Arms Contro4 Oceans, International Operations and Environment of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 93-94 (statement by Northcutt
Ely, counsel to Deepsea Ventures, Inc.). However, coordinating these laws
presents some problems. See Van Dyke & Yuen, "Common Heritage" v. "Freedom
of the High Seas". Which Governs the Seabed?, 19 SAN DIEGO . REV. 493, 546
(1982).
188. See Ratiner, supra note 11, at 1010, for expression of the differing views
within the United States Delegation.
189. Id. at 1011.
190. President Expresses Belief that Twin Goals Could be Achieved at Session,
19 U.N. MosNy CHRON., May 1982, at 23.
191. See Molitor, The U.S. Deep Seabed Mining Regulations: The Legal Basis
for an Alternative Regime, 19 SAN DIEGO L REV. 599, 611 (1982). Good faith is a
fundamental element in the negotiation of multilateral agreements. Id. at 611 n.69.
'This wanton disregard of the world body... deserves... outright condemna-
tion." Dacca, The Bangladesh Times, Mar. 3, 1982, translated and reprinted in 192
WORLDWIDE REPORTS, LAV OF THE SEA 14 (1982).
192. Int'l Herald Tribune, Sept. 6, 1982, at 5. See appendix to Richardson, The
United States Posture Toward the Law of the Sea Convention: Awkward but not
Irreparable, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 505, 514 (1983), for the reciprocating states
nations will sign and ratify the treaty to obtain its many benefits
and to preserve good relations with Third World countries.1
93
France signed the Convention on the day it was opened for signa-
ture. 9 4 Subsequent ratification of the Convention will eliminate
its participation in such agreements. 195 The same will be true of




Issues of boundary delimitation continue to be intensely de-
bated because no acceptable formula exists to calculate the divid-
ing line between continental shelves.196 Every boundary dispute
presents a unique situation requiring consideration of each coun-
try's geography and other relevant circumstances. UNCLOS III
leaves this problem unresolved. Article 83, paragraph 1 of the
Convention provides, as a vague guideline, that opposite and adja-
cent states should reach an equitable solution in determining the
continental shelf boundary.19
7
In a 1982 opinion, Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,198 the In-
ternational Court of Justice interpreted article 83, paragraph 1 as
embodying the trend in customary international law to de-empha-
agreement signed on September 2, 1982, by the United States, the Federal Repub,
lie of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.
193. See Law of the Sea Negotiations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Arms
Contro4 Oceans, International Operations and Environment of the Senate Comm
on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1981) (statement of Ambassador
Richardson); 1982 Hearings, supra note 26, at 33 (testimony of Leigh S. Ratiner);
Lippman & Ross, Refusal to Sign Treaty Puts American Prospects in Doubt, Wash.
Post, July 18, 1982, at Li, col 3.
194. Zuleta, The Law of the Sea After Montego Bay, 20 SAN DiGo L. REv. 475,
n.1 (1983).
195. Ratiner, supra note 11, at 1017. "Article 137, paragraph 3 prohibits states
from recognizing seabed mining claims which are not derived from the Treaty.
Under customary international law principles of treaty interpretation, a state
which signs a treaty is bound not to act incompatibly with it, pending its ratifica-
tion and entry into force." Id,
196. For a discussion of the international efforts towards an acceptable rule on
continental shelf delimitation, see Adede, Toward the Formulation of the Rule of
Delimitation of Sea Boundaries Between States With Adjacent or Opposite Coasts,
19 VA. J. INT'L L. 207 (1979). Korea and China are debating which legal principles
to apply in delimiting the continental shelf under the Yellow Sea. Pak, The Conti-
nental Shelf Between Korea; Japan, and China, 4 MARiNE PoL'Y REP. 1, 3 (1982).
197. The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or
adjacent coasts shall be made by agreement on the basis of international law, as
referred to in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in or-
der to achieve an equitable solution. Convention, supra note 106, art. 83(1).
198. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya Arab Jamahiriya),
reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATIAT-s 225 (1982).
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size the equidistance principle' 99 in favor of a solution based on
"equitable principles." The parties requested the court to state
what rules of international law may be applied for delimitation of
the continental shelf, taking into account "equitable principles
and the relevant circumstances which characterize the area, as
well as the new accepted trends admitted at the Third [United
Nations] Conference on the Law of the Sea."
2 0 0
Both Tunisia and Libya argued that a determination of the nat-
ural submarine prolongation of their land would correctly delimit
the boundary.0o The court, however, ruled that the natural pro-
longation theory alone could not govern determination of the
boundary because the shelf between these two adjacent countries
extends beyond their shore as one continuous shelf. To achieve
an equitable solution, the court had to look beyond physical char-
acteristics to a consideration of other circumstances such as eco-
nomic interests and historical factors.
202
In January 1981, Malta sought to intervene in the Tunisia/Libya
case pursuant to article 62 of the court's statute, which allows in-
tervention by one whose legal interests may be affected.203 Be-
cause Tunisia and Libya did not ask the court to establish the
dividing line, but simply to determine which rules to apply in de-
limiting the boundary, the court held that Malta's interests were
not directly affected within the meaning of article 62.204 As a re-
sult of this denial, Malta and Libya recently petitioned the court
to determine which rules to apply in delimiting their continental
199. The equidistance-special circumstances rule as set out in article 6(2) of the
1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf provides that in absence of
agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances,
the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance
from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea of each State is measured.
200. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya Arab Jamahiriya),
reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIAIs 225, 228 (1982).
201. Id. at 239.
202. Id. at 262-63.
203. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/LAbya Arab Jamahiriya):
Application by Malta for Permission to Intervene, 1981 LC.J. 3. This is "the first
time the International Court of Justice has squarely faced and ruled on the right
of a third state to intervene in a case to which two other states are parties." Com-
ment, Intervention in the International Court, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 903 (1981).
204. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya Arab Jamahiriya):
Application by Malta for Permission to Intervene, 1981 LC.J. 3, 19; see Leigh, Judi-
cial Decisions, 75 Am. J. INTL L. 949 (1981).
shelf.205
Another continental shelf case now before the International
Court of Justice involves a decade-long dispute over the maritime
boundary in the Gulf of Maine.20 6 Invoking a Special Agreement
annexed to the Boundary Settlement Treaty between Canada and
the United States, the parties agreed to submit their dispute
either to a Chamber of the International Court, or if the chamber
could not be constituted within six months, to an ad hoc court of
arbitration.207 On January 20, 1982, the court agreed to accommo-
date the parties' "special agreement" by forming a chamber of
five judges to hear the dispute.208 The case should be a landmark
in the delimitation of sea boundaries as the first decision to estab-
lish a single maritime boundary for both the continental shelf and
fishery zones. 209
Fishing Disputes
Although the majority of coastal nations claim jurisdiction over
tuna and other highly migratory species within their 200-mile eco-
205. A New Case is Submitted- Continental Shelf (Libya Arab Jamahirya/
Malta), U.N. Communique No. 89-14, July 27, 1982.
206. Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area, reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 69 (1982). The United States
and Canada are presently involved in four bilateral boundary disputes: Gulf of
Maine, Dixon Entrance, Strait of Juan de Fuca, and Beaufort Sea. Resolution of
the Gulf of Maine dispute will likely influence the outcome of the other delimita-
tions. Note, Delimiting Continental Shelf Boundaries in the Arctic: The US-Ca-
nada Beaufort Sea Boundary, 22 VA. J. INr'L L. 221, 223 (1981). The Gulf of Maine
case will be the first to use the 1972 Rules of Procedure adopted by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, allowing the parties to bring their dispute before a Cham-
ber of the court rather than the full court. Here, the parties have not only a role in
the selection of the judges, but also a decisive voice as to the number of judges.
Rhee, Equitable Solutions to the Maritime Boundary Dispute Between the United
States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 595-97 (1981); Feld-
man & Colson, The Maritime Boundaries of the United States, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 729,
762-63 (1981).
207. See SPECIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA TO SUBMIT TO A CHAMBER OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE THE DELIMITATION OF THE MARITIME BOUND-
ARY IN THE GULF OF MAINE AREA, S. EXEC. Doc. UJV, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979),
reprinted in -9 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 157, 169 (M. Nordquist & K.
Simmons, eds. 1980).
208. Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area, reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERAIS 69, 72-73 (1982). Because the
present court does not include a Canadian judge, the acting president also ac-
ceded to Canada's request to choose a Canadian judge ad hoc pursuant to article
31(2). Id. at 73. As a result, all five judges will be from industrialized western
states. This raises an important policy question: because the issue is likely to
concern many states, is it proper for the Chamber to be composed solely of judges
from western states? Comment, International Adjudication: Settlement of the
United States-Canada Maritime Boundary Dispute, 23 HARv. INT'L LJ. 138, 142
(1982).
209. Rhee, supra note 206, at 602.
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nomic zone, the United States refuses to recognize this jurisdic-
tion.210 Following this policy, commercial tuna fleets from the
United States fish as they please beyond the twelve-mile territo-
rial sea of coastal States and risk having their boats seized by na-
tions that claim jurisdiction beyond twelve miles. 21 1 In the last
two years, for example, Mexico has seized fourteen tuna boats
from the United States and fined the owners more than $6 mil-
lion.212 United States law encourages tuna fishermen to risk
seizure by providing reimbursement for their losses,213 and by
giving the State Department authority to ban importation of fish
products from the impounding country.214 Because the fines are
paid from taxes, the American taxpayer, in effect, is subsidizing
the Pacific tuna industry. As a result of these seizures, the United
States has also placed an embargo on Mexican-caught tuna.
2 15
Recognizing that such retaliatory measures worsen United
States relations with Mexico and other coastal nations, several
members of Congress are seeking legislation to ameliorate the
problem.216 In a speech supporting the American Tuna Protection
Act, Senator Weicker urged other senators to recognize exclusive
jurisdiction over tuna within the economic zone before the United
States alienates all its South Pacific friends.217 The State Depart-
210. 128 CONG. REC. H839 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1982) (statement of Rep. McClos-
key); see Comment, The Tuna War: Fishery Jurisdiction in International Law,
1981 U. hi. L. F. 755.
211. See H. REP. No. 54, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1669, 1671-72.
212. San Diego Union, Aug. 7, 1982, at B3, col. 6. During 1980, Costa Rica, Mex-
ico, Ecuador, and Peru seized 22 United States flag tuna vessels. The fines and
other charges paid by United States fishermen totalled over $9.6 million. 127
CONG. REc. S11565 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1981). In March 1982, Papua New Guinea
(PNG) seized a United States tuna vessel for fishing without a license within its
200-mile economic zone. PNG officials confiscated the vessel, its equipment, and
600 tons of tuna, worth approximately $300 million. 128 CONG. REC. H839 (daily ed.
Mar. 11, 1982) (statement by Rep. McCloskey). However, PNG later returned the
catch and released the vessel. One editorial points to the substantial American in-
vestment in PNG as a cause for this change of heart. AFP (Hong Kong), Mar. 12,
1982, reprinted in 191 WORLDWIDE REPORTS, LAW OF THE SEA 14 (1981).
213. 22 U.S.C. § 1977(a) (1976).
214. 16 U.S.C. § 1825(b) (1976).
215. San Diego Union, Aug. 7, 1982, at B3, col. 6.
216. On September 10, 1981, Representative Luken introduced H.R. 4455, the
'"Tuna Protection Act." 127 CONG. REC. H6143 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1981). Senator
Weicker introduced S. 1564, the "American Tuna Protection Act," on September
16, 1981. 127 CONG. REC. S9101 (daily ed. Sept 16, 1982).
217. 127 CONG. REC. S14575-76 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1981) (statement by Sen.
Weicker).
ment opposes such legislation as an ineffective unilateral effort
that will only harm the American fishing industry. According to a
State Department spokesperson, this industry can only be man-
aged effectively through regional agencies.2 18
The United States position is reflected in article 64 of the Con-
vention, which requires coastal States and other interested coun-
tries to cooperate in forming regional international
organizations. 2 1 9 However, the degree of authority given these re-
gional bodies is unclear.220 Coastal States interpret this article as
recognizing their sovereign right over tuna traveling through their
waters 221 the United States and other nations maintain that the
legislative history of article 64 clearly shows an intent to establish
regional management of tuna to the exclusion of sovereign
jurisdiction.222
Falkland (Malvinas) Island Dispute and Antarctica
The Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982 had seri-
ous law of the sea ramifications for ownership of Antarctica re-
sources. Argentina has long claimed ownership of not only the
Falklands, but also of that portion of Antarctic resources which
would accompany the Islands within a 200-mile EEZ.22 The
EEZs around the Falkland Islands, South Georgias, and the
South Sandwich Islands (all administered by the United King-
dom)224 would control broad expanses of the Antarctic's oceans
and the exploitation of its vast resources.
A fierce battle rages for control of Antarctic resources not gov-
218. Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Stocks: Hearings on S. 1564 Before the Comm on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1981) (statement
of Theodore G. Kronmiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and
Fisheries Affairs).
219. Convention, supra note 106, art. 64, para. 1.
220. Dyke & Heftel, Tuna Management in the Pacific: An Analysis of the South
Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, 3 U. HAWAii L REV. 1, 4 (1981).
221. Id. at 4-5. Coastal States interpret the language of article 64(2) of the Con-
vention as incorporating articles 56, 61, and 62. Id.
222. Speech by August Felando at Law of the Sea Symposium, University of
San Diego (Apr. 24, 1982); Dyke & Heftel, supra note 220, at 1.
223. Hayton, The "American"Antarctic, 50 Am. J. INr'L L. 583, 587-88 (1956). Ac-
cording to Robert Hayton, Argentina has propagandized its Falkland and Antarctic
claims with a "dedication verging on fanaticism." Id. at 587-88.
224. The British Title to Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, 8
POLAR REC. 125, 128-33 (1956).
225. Convention, supra note 106, arts. 156, 157. Not only is the Antarctic likely
to contain vast quantities of coal, gold, and uranium, Joyner, The Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone and Antarctica, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 691, 701 (1981), but the U.S. Geologi-
cal Survey has calculated that the Western Antarctic Continental Shelf contains
45 billion barrels of oil and 115 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Spivak, Frozen As-
sets?, Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1974, at 1. For a comprehensive treatment of the subject,
see Auburn, Offshore Oil and Gas in Antarctica, 22 GER. Y.B. INT'L I. 139 (1977).
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erned by the Antarctic Treaty.X6 One of the major resources now
exploited are small shrimp-like animals called krill.22 7 The owners
of Antarctic islands will gain strong claims to krill when the treaty
is renegotiated, because of the newly established 200-mile EEZs
surrounding the islands.
Because there are disputed claims as to areas within Antarctica
itself,228 the ownership of Antarctic islands may affect claims to
portions of that continent. The Argentine invasion of the Falk-
lands, had it been successful, would have established a
stronghold from which Argentina could assert future Antarctic
claims. Such invasions may become more commonplace in light
of the unsettled sovereignty and potentially great riches of the
Antarctic continent.2 29
International Whaling
This year several important issues faced whale protection
groups,23 0 the most important of which was the protection of the
sperm whale now in danger of extinction.231 Even after an IWC
vote in 1981 of 25 to 1 to place a moratorium on sperm whale kill-
ing, the sole dissenter (Japan) continues to refuse to stop hunting
these whales.23 2 A second and equally serious problem is the
"cold" harpoon.233 Although the International Whaling Commis-
sion agreed by consensus in 1981 to prohibit use of the "cold" har-
poon after the 1982 whaling season, four signatory countries
226. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.LA.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71
(scheduled for renegotiation in 1991).
227. Joyner, supra note 225, at 702-03.
228. The major concentrations of krill are located in potential EEZs of both the
continent and some of the islands. See B. MITCHELL & J. TINKER, ANTARCnCA AND
ITS RESOURCES 67 (1980).
229. Joyner, supra note 225, at 700.
230. The two major organizations which protect whaling are the International
Whaling Commission (IWC) and the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species (CTIES). These organizations will continue to control whaling
even after the adoption of the Convention, which defers its power in this area to
the major whale protection societies.
231. L. Times, July 18, 1982, § 5, at 2, col 6.
232. Id. Although the IWC is without authority to enforce its decisions, the
threat of economic sanctions by the United States and other members may be suf-
ficient to assure compliance if those methods were used. The Pell and Packwood
amendments to the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 provide
that the United States can deny fishing rights within the United States 200-mile
zone and halt all fish imports of nations that ignore commission decisions. Pub. L.
No. 96-61, 93 Stat. 407 (1979).
233. A "cold" harpoon is one that uses no exploding tip.
(Japan, Soviet Union, Norway and Iceland) have announced that
they will continue to use the harpoon until a suitable explosive
replacement can be developed.234 The invention of such a device
could take years as some species of whales, such as the Minke, 235
are so small that the explosive charge in the harpoon destroys
much of the whales' economic value.
The thirty-fourth annual meeting of the IWC took place in
Brighton, England during the week of July 18, 1982.236 The issue
which proved to be the most controversial was the ban on com-
mercial whaling.237 After several years of failing to gain the three-
fourths majority to impose a moratorium,2 38 the ban was finally
agreed upon. Twenty-five nations, including the United States,
voted in favor of the ban. Although seven nations including Ja-
pan, Norway, and the Soviet Union, which together account for
ninety percent of all commercial whaling,239 oppose it, the morato-
rium begins on January 1, 1986.240 For whalers, this represents a
drastic change from their present quota of over 14,000 whales. 24'
Some IWC observers expect resistance to the moratorium from
those nations who now oppose it.242 Norway, in fact, has already
vowed at the July meeting not to honor the ban.24 3 Owing to in-
creasing popular support of the ban, however, international trade
sanctions could be imposed against those countries failing to
comply.244
234. ANm L WELFARE INSTrrUTE, SAvE THE WHALEs (Apr. 1982).
235. Over 80 percent of ill whales caught in 1981 were Minke whales. L.A.
Times, July 18, 1982, § 5, at 2, col. 6.
236. The IWC was established by the International Convention for the Regula-
tion of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.LA.S. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72. The IWC
presently boasts a 36-nation membership.
237. Japan led the fight against this proposal. Japan is the world's largest con-
sumer of whale meat. Its whaling industry is also the largest in the world, employ-
ing an estimated 50,000 persons. The Japanese contend that the IWC is
underestimating the available whale stocks and therefore the quotas are based on
inaccurate information and are overly restrictive. L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 1979, § 8, at
1, col. 1.
238. Id.
239. San Diego Tribune, Aug. 2, 1982, at B10, col. 1.
240. Id.
241. LA. Times, July 18, 1982, § 5, at 2, coL 6. Six years ago, the quota was 25,000
whales; three years ago it was 20,102 whales; two years ago the quota was 15,656
whales; and last year the Commission set the quota at 14,553. Approximately
14,000 whales were actually taken in that year. San Diego Tribune, Aug. 2, 1982, at
B10, coL 1.
242. LA. Times, Nov. 23, 1979, § 8, at 1, col 1.
243. San Diego Tribune, Aug. 2, 1982, at B10, col. 1.
244. In 1972, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
adopted the whale as the symbol of the environmental crisis facing this planet and
called unanimously for a ten-year moratorium on further killing of the species.
L. Times, Nov. 23, 1979, § 8, at 1, coL 1. The United Nations could choose to en-
courage and support sanctions against whaling nations. Id. Also in 1972, the
United States adopted a landmark law, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, which
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After eight years of working to create a universally acceptable
treaty, all participants left the eleventh session disappointed at
their failure to achieve consensus. Many commentators and rep-
resentatives viewed UNCLOS m as an experiment in interna-
tional cooperation, which could serve as an impetus to collectively
solve other difficult global problems. The effect of the interna-
tional legal regime established depends on which States sign and
ratify the treaty. Regardless of the outcome, much can be said for
the accomplishments of UNCLOS I as it draws to an end. The
delegates produced an elaborate document encompassing a broad
range of issues on uses of ocean space. Some of its concepts have
already received widespread adoption. At the very least, the
treaty provides a blueprint for future undertakings when the
world community seeks anew that elusive goal: a comprehensive
law of the sea agreement which attracts worldwide consensus.
G. DAvm ROBERTSON
GAYLENE VASATURO
gave legal protection to whales, dolphins, seals, sea otters and other marine mam-
mals. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976). The importation of their products was banned. Also,
a 1971 law gives the President the authority to embargo fishery products from na-
tions "which diminish the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation
program." 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976). President Reagan has supported the whaling
moratorium and made those views known at the 1981 IWC meeting. N.Y. Times,
July 21, 1981, at A5, coL 5.

